UBS: Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Save

UBS: Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Save

In March 2023, the Swiss National Bank lent Credit Suisse CHF 168 billion, more than any central bank had ever lent a single bank. UBS today is far bigger than Credit Suisse ever was. Can a country of nine million people still supervise, support or wind down the giant it created? We are analyzing the aftermath of the most spectacular bank collapse in history.

NOVEMBER 12, 2026. FILIA PATER. APPR. 9 MIN.

Sunday, 19 March 2023, Bern

It was a Sunday evening, and the lights in Bern were burning late. The Federal Council, the Swiss National Bank and the financial regulator FINMA had spent the weekend bargaining with the chairmen of UBS and Credit Suisse, while regulators in Washington and London waited for the Swiss to decide before the markets in Asia opened. In Conspiracy Suisse, a similar meeting takes place in the novel's final chapter, in a FINMA conference room where a quotation from Henry Ford hangs on the wall: "It is well enough that the people of the nation do not understand our banking and monetary system, for if they did, I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning." Beneath it, someone has written: It is your job to understand it!

This is Part 2 of our series Credit Suisse, UBS, and Switzerland's Future. In Part 1, we asked whether the enlarged UBS could be next. Today we turn the question around. Not "is UBS at risk?" but "is Switzerland at risk because of UBS?" The phrase "too big to fail" has been part of the banking vocabulary since 2008. It means a bank whose failure would wreck the economy, so the state cannot let it fail. The darker cousin of that phrase is "too big to save": a bank so large that the state could not rescue it even if it wanted to.

Three questions decide which of the two describes UBS. Can Switzerland supervise it? Can Switzerland support it in a crisis? And if all else fails, can Switzerland wind it down without taking the whole country with it?

Too Big to Save: The Arithmetic Nobody Likes

Start with the numbers that were actually needed in 2023. As Credit Suisse bled deposits, the Swiss National Bank lent it a peak of CHF 168 billion, through ordinary emergency loans and two facilities invented overnight by emergency decree. The SNB itself called it the largest liquidity support ever provided to a single bank anywhere in the world. On top came up to CHF 100 billion of federally guaranteed loans and a CHF 9 billion loss guarantee for UBS. The emergency facilities and the guarantee were repaid or cancelled by August 2023, and the state even earned fees. It worked.

Now look at what that money was rescuing. Credit Suisse was the smaller of the two big banks. Today's UBS has a balance sheet of about USD 1.66 trillion, roughly twice Switzerland's entire annual output. A run on UBS would not be a run on the second-largest Swiss bank. It would be a run on the only large one left, with no domestic rival big enough to take it over on a Sunday evening.

The SNB can create Swiss francs at will; that is what central banks do. But a global bank does not only owe francs. It owes dollars in New York, pounds in London and euros in Frankfurt, and a central bank can only lend those if it holds them or borrows them from other central banks. The Swiss financial site finews asked the uncomfortable question right after the crisis: if Credit Suisse already tested the limits of the SNB, is saving, splitting or nationalising UBS even possible? Nobody in Bern has given a confident answer since. That silence is the real meaning of "too big to save".

Can Switzerland Supervise It? A Watchdog Without Teeth

In December 2024, a parliamentary commission of inquiry, the PUK, published its 500-page report on the Credit Suisse collapse. It placed the main blame squarely on the bank's years of mismanagement, and noted that bonuses paid to Credit Suisse management between 2010 and 2022 exceeded the bank's CHF 34 billion of losses. But it did not spare the watchdog. FINMA, the commission found, had granted Credit Suisse a regulatory filter on its capital in 2017 that let the bank keep up the appearance of sufficient capitalisation until the very end.

The deeper problem was not one bad decision. It was that FINMA had remarkably few weapons. Unlike its counterparts in London or Washington, it cannot fine a bank. As of today, that is still true: a reform to change it has not yet passed into law. FINMA itself admitted it had been poorly equipped to intervene compared with international peers.

The Federal Council is now trying to change that. On 12 August 2026, it opened a consultation on the last part of its too-big-to-fail package, which runs until 19 November 2026. It would:

  • give FINMA the power to fine banks up to 10% of their annual operating income and impose daily penalty payments;
  • introduce a senior managers regime, so that named executives answer for named decisions;
  • add retention periods and clawbacks on bonuses at systemically important banks;
  • let FINMA intervene earlier, before a bank's position deteriorates further.

The Swiss Bankers Association has warned against a worrying accumulation of powers that would turn FINMA into a "superauthority". The irony is hard to miss. Switzerland is debating whether its regulator is becoming too powerful, while the bank it supervises has grown larger than the economy that regulator serves.

The novel's journalist Lilith Bahti would not have been surprised. In chapter 8, she complains that bankers "never seem to be held accountable for their actions, even when they drive the economy into the ground." In chapter 34, the fictional judge refuses to hold SWB's CEO personally liable, because nothing proves he put his own interest before the bank's. The senior managers regime is, at heart, an attempt to write that missing rule.

A woman and a man are supervising the lifting of a fictional glass banking tower.

Can Switzerland Support It? The Safety Net Still Not Woven

In a crisis, a healthy bank can still die of thirst: clients withdraw faster than assets can be sold. That is why central banks lend in emergencies, and why most financial centres also have a "Public Liquidity Backstop" (PLB): a state guarantee that lets the central bank lend even when the bank has run out of good collateral. The Financial Stability Board recommends it. Switzerland's government first proposed one in 2022.

In March 2023, it still did not exist in law, so it had to be conjured by emergency decree. The Federal Council sent a bill to parliament in September 2023. More than three years later, it has still not been passed. A Senate committee suspended it and tied it to the wider too-big-to-fail package, and economists at the University of Bern note that the bill has faced delays well into 2026. The August 2026 consultation now proposes to widen banks' access to SNB liquidity and to force them to prepare collateral in advance, exactly what former SNB chairman Thomas Jordan asked for after the crisis. He also warned that the improvised ELA+ facility should never become a regular instrument.

Why the hesitation? Because a safety net is also a subsidy. The same Bern economists estimate that too-big-to-fail status cut the big Swiss banks' funding costs by at least USD 2.9 billion in 2022 alone. Lenders charge less to a bank they expect the state to save. Every strand added to the net makes that expectation stronger.

In chapter 67 of the novel, the Grand Master is entirely cynical about this. The Swiss government will take over the risk, he tells his bankers, and "at some point, the head of the National Bank will come out and say that the financial system would have collapsed if they hadn't backed the transaction." Real life followed the script. In late 2023, the SNB chairman said the takeover had prevented a global financial crisis. He may well have been right. But that is precisely how a bank becomes too big to fail: each rescue is justified by the disaster it prevented, and each justification makes the next rescue more certain.

Can Switzerland Wind It Down? The Bail-In That Never Happened

After 2008, the world promised itself that big banks would never again be rescued with public money. Instead, a failing bank would go through resolution: shareholders wiped out, certain bondholders converted into new owners (the so-called bail-in), and the bank reopened on Monday, smaller but alive. Switzerland built exactly such a plan for Credit Suisse. According to the Financial Stability Board, FINMA had run two bail-in valuations, in November 2022 and March 2023, together with foreign regulators. A full bail-in would have let Credit Suisse reopen with a CET1 ratio of about 44%, a fortress balance sheet on paper.

The plan was never used. Fearing contagion, the authorities chose a takeover backed by public guarantees. The AT1 bonds were wiped out, but the bail-in bonds one rank above them, which the plan would have converted, were spared. A 2026 study published through the Bank for International Settlements, co-written by the economist who chaired the Swiss government's expert group on banking stability, examined around 2,000 bonds from 94 banks. Its conclusion is sobering: since that weekend, markets everywhere believe bail-in is less likely. Investors now charge weaker banks less for their risk, because they expect a rescue instead. The rulebook built after 2008 lost much of its authority over a single Swiss weekend.

For UBS, resolution is even harder. Much of its business sits in foreign subsidiaries supervised in the United States, Britain and the European Union. In a crisis, each host regulator would try to protect its own depositors first. That is the hidden logic behind the capital fight described in Part 1. Requiring UBS to back its foreign subsidiaries with capital held in Switzerland is meant to ensure that those units could be sold or wound down without dragging the Swiss parent into the wreckage. The International Monetary Fund has urged Switzerland to hold regular cross-border crisis simulations and to fold its emergency plan into its formal resolution plan.

The novel's epilogue stages the same dilemma in a boardroom. As SWB's share price collapses in chapter 56, its fictional directors argue over selling divisions, selling shares or asking the state for a loan. One of them objects that the bank's divisions are too interconnected to be sold separately; another, that the domestic business cannot be sold at all. Fiction or not, that is a fair description of why winding down a universal bank is so much harder on paper than in a crisis.

People are lifting a fictional glass banking tower.

The Novel's "Swiss Solution" and Its Price

Conspiracy Suisse ends with a rescue, and it is worth being honest about what kind. In chapter 67, the Grand Master gathers five Swiss private bankers in his lakeside mansion and asks them to take over SWB together. When they hesitate over the risks, he reassures them that the Swiss government will carry them, with a long-term state loan of some CHF 250 billion. "Our countrymen – the brave Swiss taxpayers – will support it," he says. Even the novel's happy ending is paid for by the public.

The real Switzerland of 2026 does not have that option. There is no group of Swiss banks large enough to absorb UBS, and the only foreign buyers big enough would end its Swiss identity, which is exactly the fear the novel was written around. Chapter 4 already put it in Grimavi's mouth: "We will not be able to absorb another sortie." Reading it today, the line sounds less like a knight's lament and more like a summary of the entire too-big-to-fail debate.

Threat or Treasure?

UBS is not a threat in the sense of a bank about to fail. It is profitable, liquid and, with a CET1 ratio of 14.7%, solidly capitalised by today's rules. The threat is structural. Switzerland's regulator still cannot fine it. The state's emergency liquidity net still lives partly in emergency law. And the resolution plan that was meant to make bailouts unnecessary was set aside the one time it was tested. Each of these gaps is being worked on, and each reform is contested. Until they are closed, the honest answer to our headline is that UBS is both too big to fail and, in a severe enough storm, close to too big to save.

That is why the capital fight matters so much. Every franc of extra capital lowers the chance that the state's arithmetic is ever tested. Every franc also raises the temptation for UBS to leave. Switzerland is trying to make its giant safe without driving it away, and nobody yet knows whether both are possible.

Construction of fictional glass banking towers in the sky.

Epilogue

Next in Series: Credit Suisse Collapsed. Who Benefited?

In this series of articles, we are looking at the real events that unfolded after the collapse of Credit Suisse in detail. In Conspiracy Suisse, the descendants of the Knights Templar emerge from the shadows to claim ownership of Switzerland's most powerful bank. Behind the legal battle lies a struggle for financial power that has lasted centuries. This website informs about topics that are touched upon in the novel. For the basics of how banks create the money they lend, see What Everyone Should Know About Money; for the full story of the fallen bank, Fascinating Misfortune of Credit Suisse. You can read the first five chapters of the novel for free if you wish.

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Series: Credit Suisse, UBS, and Switzerland's Future

Forum Topic: Swiss Banking and the Collapse of Credit Suisse

Tags: too big to fail, UBS, banking